Dividing the Waters: Water Marketing as a Conflict Resolution Strategy in the Edwards Aquifer Region by Ronald A. Kaiser & Laura M. Phillips
     
 
               University of Arkansas 
     System Division of Agriculture 
NatAgLaw@uark.edu   $   (479) 575-7646                           
 
   
 
 An Agricultural Law Research Article 
 
 
 
 
Dividing the Waters: Water Marketing as a 
Conflict Resolution Strategy in the  
Edwards Aquifer Region 
 by    
 
 Ronald A. Kaiser & Laura M. Phillips 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Originally published in NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL 
38 NAT. RESOURCES J.  411 (1998) 
 
 
 
 www.NationalAgLawCenter.org 
 
RONALD A. KAISER" and LAURA M. PHILLIPS" 
Dividing the Waters: Water Marketing 
as a Conflict Resolution Strategy in the 
Edwards Aquifer Region 
ABSTRACf 
In central Texas, an increasing urban and environmental demand 
for water, coupled with limited supplies in the Edwards Aquifer, 
collided with the legal right of landowners to pump an unlimited 
amount ofgroundwater. There clearly was not enough water in the 
Aquifer to meet current and future needs. In response to this water 
crisis, the Texas legislature created the Edwards Aquifer Authority 
and gave it extensive regulatory power to control pumping and to 
reallocate water through market mechanisms. Water marketing 
offers a means to minimize conflicts over the reallocation ofwater 
from lower economic valued agricultural uses to higher valued 
domestic, industrial, environmental and recreational uses. This 
article outlines a conceptual framework for a market-based water 
reallocation system and then applies this framework to the Edwards 
Aquifer region. The article suggests that there is a strong willing­
ness on the part of stakeholders in the Edwards region to use 
markets to reallocate water and proposes an approach to encourage 
market development. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Texas has made Faustian choices in allocating and managing water 
in the Edwards Aquifer. The laissez-faire capture rule adopted by the Texas 
Supreme Coure and followed. by the Texas Legislature2 minimized political 
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1. Under the Texas water law of "absolute ownership/capture," pumping is 
unregulated and landowners are allowed to withdraw as much groundwater from beneath 
their land as they can capture. In the exercise of this right there is no liability absent malice, 
willful waste, or subsidence. See Houston & Tex. Cent. RR v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (Tex. 
1904); City of Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1955); Smith-Southwest 
Indus. v. Friendswood Dev. Co., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978); City of Sherman v. Public UtiJ. 
Comm'n, 643 S.w.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983). 
2. The Texas Legislature codified this common law rule of capture by expressly 
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conflicts over governmental regulation of water pumping but it left the 
Edwards Aquifer subject to uncontrolled and harmful purnping.3 Although 
the capture rule has been widely criticized4 the Texas Supreme Court has 
consistently turned aside reform efforts and has deferred to the legislature 
to develop rules for groundwater protection.s 
As a consequence of the capture rule the Edwards Aquifer was 
treated as a common pool resource} resulting in distribution and supply 
scarcity and posing environmental risks to the endangered plants and 
animals living in the springs flowing from the Aquifer.7 These risks became 
very apparent in 1989 and 1990, when a combination of hot summers, 
drought conditions and excessive pumping significantly decreased flows 
recognizing the rights of landowners in underground water. See VERNON'S TEXAS CODE ANN. 
§ 52.002 (West 1994), repealed by Acts of 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 933, § 6 (effective Sept. 1,1995; 
now codified at TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 911.021(a) (West 1997). 
3. The capture role applies to percolating water and not to underground streams or the 
underflow of rivers. See Bartley v. Sone 527 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e); Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex. App.-Austin 
1989, writ denied); TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 911.021(a) (West 1997). 
4. For trenchant articles See Joe Greenhill & Thomas Gee, Oumership ofGroundwater in 
Texas: The East Case Reconsidered, 33 TEX. 1. REV. 620, 629 (1955) (urging Texas courts and 
Texas Legislature to adopt roles prohibiting malicious waste of water); Corwin Johnson, Texas 
Groundwater lAw: A Suroey and Some Proposals, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1017 (1982) (discussing 
wastefulness of absolute ownership of percolating groundwater); Corwin Johnson, The 
Continuing Void in Texas Groundwater lAw: Are Concepts and Terminology to Blame, 17 ST. MARY'S 
1.J. 1281 (1986); Karen Morris, The Stagnation of Texas Groundwater lAw: A Political v. 
Environmental Stalemate, 22 ST. MARY'S 1.J. 493 (1990); Eric Behrens & Matthew Dore, Rights 
oflAndowners to Percolating Groundwater in Texas, 32 S. TEx. 1. REv. 185 (1991); Lana Shadwick, 
Note, Obsolescence, Environmental Endangerment, and Possible Federal Interoention Compel 
Refonnation of Texas Groundwater lAw, 32 S. TEX. 1. REv. 641 (1991); David Todd, Common 
Resources, Private Rights and Liabilities: A Case Study on Texas Groundwater lAw, 32 NAT. 
REsoURCES J. 233 (1992); Jana Kinkade, Compromise and Groundwater Conseroation, 26 ST. B. TEX. 
ENVTL. 1.J. 230 (1996). 
5. In upholding the constitutionality of the Edwards Aquifer Authority, the Texas 
Supreme Court reaffinned it's preference for legislative rather than judicial resolution of 
groundwater problems. See Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation 
Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Tex. 1996). 
6. The often-unappreciated side effect of the absolute ownership or capture rule is that 
current well owners are not protected from excessive pumping by other landowners. See Pecos 
County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No.1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. Civ. 
App.-El Paso 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In essence, Texas groundwater is a common pool 
resource because it is open to any landowner who cannot exclude any other landowner from 
access and unlimited use. For a discussion of the allocation dilemma of common property 
resources, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
7. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 c.F.R. § 17.11 (1998); Endangered and 
Threatened Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.12 (1998). The ComaI and San Marcos springs are home to 
five endangered or threatened species: the Fountain Darter, the San Marcos Gambusia, the 
Texas Wild Rice, the Texas Blind Salamander, and the San Marcos Salamander. 
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in the Comal and San Marcos springs. In order to protect the aquatic plants 
and animals that rely on springflows, the Sierra Club filed a federal lawsuit 
under the Endangered Species ActS to regulate the amount of water that 
municipal, industrial, military and agricultural users could pump from the 
Aquifer.9 In January 1993, U.S. District Judge Lucius Bunton ruled in favor 
of the Sierra Club and gave the Legislature until May 31,1993, to develop 
a satisfactory plan to protect the endangered and threatened species, or face 
federal regulation of the Edwards Aquifer. 1O He declined to issue a final 
order until the State of Texas had the opportunity to address the allocation 
issues under state law. 
In response to the specter of federal regulation, the Texas 
Legislature again made a Faustian choice and opted for state rather than 
federal regulation of the Aquifer. ll The 73d Legislature enacted Senate Bill 
1477, creating the Edwards Aquifer Authority (Authority), one day before 
Judge Bunton's deadline.12 
In addition to regulating water withdrawals, the Authority must 
also manage the conflicts between urban, agricultural and environmental 
interests and uses through a demand management program.13 The 
Authority has a number of management options for meeting increasing 
water demands, including conservation, drought management, reuse, 
enhanced recharge methods, new surface water sources and the transfer of 
water through market mechanisms.14 
This paper examines the efficacy of water marketing as a method 
for reallocating water to meet increasing demands and for resolving 
8. 16 U.s.c. §§ 1531-1544 (1998). 
9. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. M0-91-eA-Q69, 1993 WL 151353 (W.D. Tex. Feb. I, 
1993). When springflow decreased to a point that hanns the endangered and threatened 
species, this constituted a "take" under § 9 of the ESA. 
10. ld. at 2-3. 
11. For a history of this dispute see Eric Albritton, The Endangered Species Act: The Fountain 
Darter Teaches What the Snail Darter Failed to Teach, 21 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1007 (1994). 
12. See Act of June 11, 1993, 73d Leg., RS. ch. 626, 1993 TEx. GEN. LAWS 2350, amended by 
Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., RS. ch. 261, 1995 TEx. SESS. LAWSERV. 2505 (West) (current 
uncodified Senate Bi1l1477 [hereinafter S.B. 1477]. 
13. Conflicts result from (1) concerns over the preservation of irrigated agriculture and 
the economic and social consequences in these fanning areas with few profitable alternatives; 
(2) increasing municipal water demands in the San Antonio Metropolitan area; (3) the need 
for water to support the military bases in San Antonio; (4) protection of environmental 
amenities and recreational activities dependent on springflows; (5) the interdependency 
between surface and groundwater flows; and (6) spring flows contributing to water for 
downstream water right holders. 
14. For a discussion of options see infra notes 63-76. 
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conflicts over water use in the Edwards Aquifer. ls A framework for a 
market-based reallocation system is suggested, and the paper reports on 
results of a transaction-willingness survey of major pumpers in the 
region.16 Finally, the paper discusses barriers to the reallocation of water 
through market mechanisms. 
II. THE EDWARDS AQUIFER SETTING 
The Edwards Aquifer provides the economic lifeblood for a 13 
county region in south central Texas, extending some 176 miles from 
Brackettville in Kinney County to Kyle in Hays County (see Figure 1). 
Including its drainage area, the Aquifer region covers 8,000 square miles 
and serves as the primary source of water for approximately 1.3 million 
people.17 Counties in the western portion are rural with agriculture as the 
primary land use and economic activity. In contrast, Bexar, Comal and 
Hays counties in the central and eastern portion of the region are urban 
and rely on the water for municipal, industrial, environmental and recrea­
tional purposes.18 Given this diversity, the people who live in the region 
have extremely divergent interests in the way the Aquifer is managed. 
15. Market transfers are predicated on consensual bargaining between conflicting parties 
where price is an information rich signal about scarcity that drives the parties to settlement. 
A water market is an institutional structure designed to facilitate the transfer of rights and 
titles to ownership in water or rights or in rights to use water. For more extensive literature 
on water marketing see Ronald Kaiser & Michael McFarland, A Bibliographic Pathfinder on 
Water Marketing, 37 NAT. REsoURCES}. 4 (1997). 
16. The survey included major irrigators, municipalities, and industrial water users in 
the Edwards Aquifer region. Lists of individuals, companies, and agencies pumping more 
than 18 million gallons of water per year from the Edwards Aquifer were obtained from the 
Edwards Underground Water District (EUWD) and the Texas Water Development Board 
(TWDB). Interviews were completed with 105 pumpers consisting of 28 irrigators, 38 
municipalities and 39 industries in Bexar, ComaI, and Hays counties. The survey also 
provided data for a master's thesis. See Laura Phillips, Barriers to Water Marketing: Opinions 
of Major Pumpers on Water Transfer Issues in the Edwards Aquifer Region (1996) 
(unpublished master's thesis, Tex. A&M U., College Station) (on file with author). 
17. The San Antonio metropolitan area is horne to approximately one million people and 
the Aquifer is the sole source of drinking water for the tenth largest metro area in the nation. 
See EDWARDS UNDERGROUND WATER DISTRICT, EDWARDS UNDERGROUND WATER DISTRICT 2, 
9 (1992) [hereinafter EUWD]. 
18. SAN ANTONIO WATER SYSTEM, THE CASE FOR NEW LEGISLATION FOR THE EDWARDS 
AQUIFER 48 (1993) [hereinafter SAWS]. 
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A. Aquifer Hydrogeology 
General features of the Edwards Aquifer hydrogeology are well 
known and have been widely publicized.19 Due to its limestone 
composition and its rapid recharge rate, the Aquifer is extremely 
transmissive, making it susceptible to rapid water level changes caused by 
pumping and drought.20 The Aquifer is a single strata system and any 
recharge, pumping, or spring discharge affects water levels across the 
entire Aquifer.21 
The Aquifer is a network of drainage, recharge and storage areas 
consisting of three distinct regions: the Edwards Plateau, the Balcones Fault 
Zone and the Coastal Plain (see Figure 1). The Edwards Plateau, 
encompassing some 4,400 square miles, is the catchment and drainage 
basin of the Aquifer. Surface water in the fonn of rainfall, runoff and spring 
flow from the Plateau is funneled into streams that flow across the recharge 
area where water penetrates the ground and replenishes the Aquifer. Since 
most aquifer recharge occurs through streambeds, this funneling effect is 
an important function of the drainage area.22 
South of the drainage area lies the Balcones Fault Zone, or the 
recharge zone. It is approximately 1,500 square miles, and includes parts 
of Kinney, Uvalde, Medina, Bexar, Comal, and Hays counties.23 In this area 
many closely spaced, nearly vertical faults occur along the relatively 
narrow Balcones Fault Zone, exposing fractured Edwards Limestone at the 
land surface.24 As the streams originating in the Plateau cross this zone, 
much of their flow percolates through the streambeds into the aquifer.25 All 
major streams in the region, except the Guadalupe River, lose water to the 
aquifer. 
19. The Edwards Underground Water District produced and distributed a report 
outlining the geology, water uses and economic growth in the Edwards Aquifer Region. See 
generally EUWD, supra note 17. 
20. See SPEOALCOMMITTEEONTIlE EDWARDS AQUIFER, COMM. REPoRT10TIlE72ND LEGIS. 
50 (1991) [hereinafter SCEA]. 
21. Changes in aquifer well levels reflect changes in pressure within the confined zone 
of the aquifer-not the actual movement of water underground. For this reason, recharge 
events raise well levels essentially instantaneously across a wide area. Correspondingly, 
pumpage at one site quickly affects well levels miles away. See SAWS, supra note 18, at II. 
22. Id. at8. 
23. See EUWD, supra note 17, at 6-7. 
24. Id. at 7. Except during flooding, streams flowing from the western part of the Plateau 
lose most of their water to recharge. When streamflow exceeds the recharge rate, water flows 
in rivers to the Coastal Plain. 
25. About 85 % of the recharge occurs where the numerous rivers and creeks cross the 
recharge zone. SCEA, supra note 20, at 49. 
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Directly south of the recharge zone lies the Edwards Coastal Plain, 
which is the Aquifer's artesian/reservoir area. It is approximately 2,100 
square miles and includes parts of Kinney, Uvalde, Medina, Bexar, Comal, 
and Hays counties.26 The groundwater in this area moves generally east 
and then northeast, toward the spring openings.27 The highest yielding 
wells are in the artesian zone along a relatively narrow band from near San 
Antonio northeastward through New Braunfels to San Marcos. Wells in 
this band commonly yield 6,000-7,000 gallons per minute.28 
Average annual recharge to the Edwards equals 640,000 acre-feet 
with an historical range from 43,000 to over 2 million acre-feet. As long as 
the recharge rate equals or exceeds the pumping rate, the Aquifer remains 
in equilibrium, and wells and springs do not dry up. 
A "bad water line," which separates high quality water from 
brackish to saline water, defines the southern edge of the reservoir area. 
Movement of this bad water line could jeopardize the quality of 
springflows at Comal Springs and San Marcos Springs, which lie 
approximately three miles from the boundary, respectively. Degradation 
of the springs' water quality could result in the loss of aquatic biota within 
the springs of the Aquifer. 
B. Water Uses 
Water from the Edwards Aquifer is the critical resource that has 
supported economic growth and development in south central Texas.29 
Over the last 40 years, population growth, industrial development and 
agricultural expansion have increased the demand for water, exacerbated 
the political tensions between urban, rural interests and complicated the 
management of the Aquifer. San Antonio grew from 200,000 in 1940 to 1.1 
million in 1990, and this growth is expected to continue.30 The population 
26. ld. 
27. See SAWS, supra note 18, at 8, 11,17. There are five springs in the Edwards Aquifer 
region: Leona (Uvalde), San Antonio and San Pedro (San Antonio), Comal (New Braunfels), 
and San Marcos (San Marcos). If there were no pumping from the aquifer, in the long run 
these spring discharges would still (after some time lag) exactly offset the aquifer's recharge. 
However, pumping rates have continued to increase rapidly, and are projected to continue 
increasing as urban growth in and around San Antonio continues. 
28. See EUWD, supra note 17, at 7. A well located 15 miles south of San Antonio in this 
artesian zone and used by a catfish fann flowed at the rate of 48,000 acre feet per year, the 
equivalent of 25% of San Antonio's total annual usage. 
29. The settlement history of the area is closely tied to the springs that flowed from the 
Edwards. The first well was drilled into the Edwards in 1865 and by 1900, wells became the 
major suppliers of water. This is as true today as it was 100 years ago. See EUWD, supra note 
17, at 4. 
30. See id. at 9. 
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of the Edwards Aquifer region is expected to increase to approximately 2.3 
million by 2020, with the highest concentration of people living in Bexar 
County.31 This population growth will increase the demand for Edwards 
Aquifer water. 
Pumping rates have mirrored population growth. Annual 
pumping from private wells has more than tripled since 1940 to an 
estimated 540,000 acre-feet in 1990.32 Water resource planners project that 
in the next 25 years water demand could exceed 850,000 acre- feet per year 
and that mining of the Aquifer could begin by the year 2000.33 
While water use patterns vary through the region, about 43 percent 
of the water is taken by irrigators and ranchers in Bexar, Medina and 
Uvalde counties and 47 percent is used by municipal, military and 
industrial users in San Antonio.34 Farmers in Uvalde and Medina counties 
irrigate more than 82,000 acres and irrigation pumping rates have increased 
31. See SAWS, supra note 18, at 52. 
32. SCEA, supra note 20, at 9-29. 
33. See EUWD, supra note 17, at 9. 
34. See SCEA, supra note 20, at 11-12. The United States Geological Service (USGS) 
calculates pumpage and presents the values by county and use category. The 1988 annual 
pumpage rates and the 1978-1988 maximum annual pumpage rates, as calculated by the 
USGS, are presented in the tables below. 
1988 Pumpage Rates (in lOOOs of acre-feet). 
Municipal Rural Domestic 
COUNTY Military Industry Irrigation Livestock lOTAL 
Kinney 0 0 1.0 0.2 1.2 
Uvalde 5.4 0.7 107.8 2.5 116.4 
Medina 6.2 0 75.3 0.7 82.2 
Bexar 250.8 7.5 18.5 36.1 302.9 
Comal 12.8 9.1 0.2 0.7 22.8 
Hays 11.1 1.5 0.1 1.7 14.4 
TOTAL 286.3 18.8 192.9 41.9 539.9 
Maximum Annual Pumpage Rates: 1978-1988 (in l000s of acre-feet). 
Municipal Rural Domestic 
COUNTY Military Industry Irrigation Livestock lOTAL 
Kinney 0 0 1.7 0.2 1.9 
Uvalde 5.8 0.7 133.2 3.2 142.9 
Medina 6.2 0 75.3 0.8 82.3 
Bexar 252.8 11.8 18.8 37.2 319.8 
ComaI 13.6 9.4 0.4 0.7 24.1 
Hays 11.1 1.9 0.9 3.0 16.9 
TOTAL 288.7 23.8 192.9 45.1 587.9 
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822% from 1958 to 1989.35 In the center of the region, San Antonio is the 
largest city in the United States that relies solely on a single aquifer for its 
water supply.36 Municipal and industrial pumping rates in Bexar County 
nearly doubled from 1958 to 1989.37 
Further to the east, the Comal and San Marcos springs are 
important recreational and environmental resources that have helped the 
region develop into a popular tourist destination. 38 The San Marcos springs 
are a designated critical habitat for the Edwards Aquifer endangered 
species.39 If pumping continues at the currept rate, the endangered species 
living in the Aquifer region are at risk of being harmed.40 
The growth of the region's population and economy continues to 
drive the increasing demand for groundwater. Due to the nature of the 
Edwards, it will always be subject to very rapid draw down whenever 
rainfall is below normal and pumping rates increase. The region has now 
reached the point that, if pumping from the aquifer remains unlimited, 
average long-term extractions will exceed the average long-term recharge.41 
35. See SAWS, supra note 18, at 52. 
36. See EUWD, supra note 17, at 2, 9. 
37. See SAWS, supra note 18, at 52. 
38. The Edwards Aquifer also affects surface water levels in Comal and Hays counties. 
Approximately thirty percent of the base flow of the Guadalupe River is supplied by the 
Springs under normal non-drought conditions, and in times of drought the Springs provide 
up to seventy percent of the base flow. See SAWS, supra note 18, at 1{}-17. 
39. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO -91-CA-Q69, 1993 WL 151353 (W.O. Tex. Feb. 1, 
1993); 50 c.F.R. § 17.11-12 (1993). The Springs are vital to maintaining the habitat of the 
Fountain Darter (Etheostoma fonticola), a one-inch long fish which lives in stream-floor areas 
covered with aquatic plants, both at and downstream of Comal and San Marcos Springs; the 
Texas Blind Salamander (Typhlomolge rathbuni), a species of salamander (perhaps the same 
as the San Marcos Salamander) which lives in the Aquifer itself and quite possibly in its 
springs; the San Marcos Gambusia, a small fish that lives in shallow water of a constant 
temperature, partially shaded by overhanging trees in the San Marcos River; and Texas Wild 
Rice (Zizania texana), a giant grass found in limited regions of the San Marcos River. The 
Springs are also home to the San Marcos Salamander (Eurycea nana), a threatened species. 
40. According to data from the San Antonio Water System in order to guarantee 
springflows of at least the long run average (210,000 AF) and continuous flow during a 
~ce of the drought of record, regional pumping would have to be reduced to 200,000 
AFlyear-38% of the 1985 pumping level. In order to guarantee springflows of approximately 
the long run average and the annual minimum during a drought (23,000 AF in 1956), regional 
pumping would have to be reduced to 250,000 AF/year-48% of the 1985 pumping level. At 
that annual minimum, however, Comal Springs could actually be dry for part of a year. See 
SAWS, supra note 18, at 24. 
41. Id. at 112. 
420 NATURALRESOURCES/OURNAL [Vol. 38 
C. The Regulatory Context 
The Edwards region has a history of conflict over the use of water. 
The establishment of the Edwards Aquifer Authority is the culmination of 
an evolutionary process to remove the exploitive incentives in Texas 
groundwater law. Born of economic, legal and political conflict and driven 
by the specter of drought, the Authority is the first serious attempt in Texas 
to regulate and allocate groundwater. The following discussion briefly 
outlines the movement from the capture rule to regulation of groundwater. 
1. The Capture Rule 
In 1904, the Texas Supreme Court in Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. 
East42 found the movement of groundwater "so secret, occult and concealed 
that an attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to them 
would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would, therefore be 
practically impossible. lie In following this line of reasoning the Court 
adopted the English rule of absolute ownership, granting landowners the 
right to withdraw as much groundwater from beneath their land as they 
capture. In the absence of malice, willful waste or subsidence this capture 
right is absolute and unqualified.44 Under a capture paradigm, 
groundwater is legally pigeonholed into such categories as percolating 
water,45 underground streams,46 and underflow of surface streams.47 While 
describing the interconnected nature of surface and groundwater, these 
42. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.w. 279 (1904). Impressed by the logic of the 1843 
English case of Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843) the Texas Supreme Court 
adopted the rule of capture. 
43. ld. at 280 (quoting Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294,314 (1861» (emphasis added). 
44. Facially, these exceptions seem to be major constraints to landowner abuse. Yet, as 
applied by Texas courts they are not limitations on wasteful exploitation. For example, in City 
of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasonton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1995), the Texas Supreme Court 
refused to find "waste" even though seventy-four percent of the 10 million gallons per day 
of groundwater that was pumped and transported through surface channels was lost to 
evaporation and bank seepage. The fact that very little, if any, of the water was put to 
beneficial use did not matter to the Court. ld at 802. Further, in Pecos County Water Control 
& Improvement Dist. No.1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954, writ 
refd n.r.e.) the Court allowed irrigators to overpump the aquifer and dry up the springs that 
contributed to surface water flow at Comanche Springs. 
45. See Bartley v. Sone,527 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd 
n.r.e.) (noting that percolating groundwater does not pertain to underground streams or water 
flowing in a defined underground channel). 
46. Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex. App-Austin 1989, writ 
denied). Groundwater is presumed to be percolating and therefore subject to the absolute 
ownership rule. See Texas Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (1927). 
47. See TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021(a) (West 1971) (declaring state ownership in 
the underflow of every flowing river). 
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categories are at the apex of a disjointed legal system that subjects 
percolating water to absolute ownership while underground streams and 
the underflow of surface streams are subject to the prior appropriation 
system. Taken to its logical legal extreme, a landowner has a legal right to 
suck his neighbors' well dry, so long as the water is percolating water, but 
is constrained if the water is from an underground stream or from 
underflow of a surface stream. This rule promotes a race to the bottom of 
the aquifer and is economically and environmentally unsound. 
Although advances in hydrology have answered many of the 
unknowns about groundwater movement, the Texas Supreme Court has 
consistently turned aside challenges to the capture rule and has deferred 
to the legislature to develop rules for groundwater protection.48 In response 
to this deferral, Texas landowners have zealously guarded the capture rule 
and have successfully turned back significant legislative attempts to limit 
groundwater pumping.49 The message is clear-politics and political 
rhetoric trump science. The political and economic totem of private 
property rights in groundwater is so entrenched in the Texas landowner 
and legislative psyche that any proposed change provokes heavy political 
opposition. Preaching the message of "private property rights" in 
groundwater has become a secular religion for many Texas landowners. 
As a result of this political and legal stalemate, Texas remains a 
jurisprudentially anomaly where groundwater and surface water allocation 
rules stand in stark contrast to commonly accepted principles of hydrology. 
With the exception of the regulatory authority granted to the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority and to the Houston-Galveston Subsidence District, 
Texas clings to this vestige of the past. Legislative efforts to protect and 
manage groundwater resources have focused on the creation of 
underground water districts. 
2. Underground Water Districts: Planning Giants, Regulatory Dwarfs 
In contrast to the unified regulatory system for surface water, the 
Texas Legislature has followed a decentralized approach to groundwater 
48. The Court has followed the East rule in City of Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 276 
S.W.2d 798 (1955); Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 
1978); and most recently in City of Sherman v. Public Uti!. Comm'n 643 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 
1983). 
49. See Karen H. Norris, Comment, The Stagnation of Texas Ground Water lAw: A Political 
and Environmental Stalemate, 22 ST. MARY's L. J. 493, 494 (1990) ("Texas landowners ... have 
successfully avoided any legislative or judicial action intended to limit groundwater 
pumpage."); Stephen E. Snyder, Comment, Ground Water Management: A Proposal for Texas, 
51 TEx. L. REV. 289,317 (1973) ("Political opposition from groundwater users will probably 
remain the most formidable obstacle to adopting an effective groundwater conservation 
program."). 
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regulation and has deferred management to local districts.50 
Notwithstanding the fact that excessive groundwater withdrawals are a 
statewide problem,51 the responsibility for creating districts and managing 
aquifers resides with .local voters.52 Problems of self interest, limited 
funding, local politics and the self-limiting nature of these districts prevent 
meaningful management and protection of groundwater resources.53 
Essentially, the legislature has passed the buck to local communities, and 
the local response to the groundwater management has been slow and 
uneven. Indeed, the Texas legislature has moved in "strange and 
mysterious ways" in not removing this anomaly and in not preventing the 
mining of the states' groundwater resources. 
In one sense, underground water districts are planning giants and 
regulatory dwarfs. They have extensive power to study, report, 
50. In 1949, under authority of the conservation amendment of the Texas Constitution, 
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59, the legislature provided for the creation of Underground Water 
Conservation Districts. See generally TEX. WATER CODE ANN. ch. 52 (West 1971) repealed by Acts 
of 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 933, § 6, eff. Sept. 1,1995. 
51. Aquifer mining has been identified as a problem in a number of Texas water plans. 
For a recent iteration see generally TEXAS WATER DEV. BD., WATER FOR TEXAS-TODAY AND 
TOMORROW (1990). 
52. TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 51.013-074 (West 1971). 
53. From the very beginning, criticisms over the localized control and limited authority 
of districts were well known to the Texas legislature. See Edward P. Woodruff, Jr. & James 
Peter Williams, Jr., Comment, Authority for "Texas Groundwater District Act", 30 TEx. 1. REV. 
862, 866 (1952) ("The act falls far short of being a complete independent groundwater code 
... it is merely a short appendage to the lengthy chapter on Water Control and Improvement 
Districts."); Snyder, supra note 49, at 298 (1973) (despite the gaping holes in the UWCDs 
management powers, however, the most serious barrier to effective action is its dependence 
on local politics. The district cannot be effective unless local residents, acting through 
popularly elected directors, are willing to impose management controls on their over 
pumping activities. None of the existing UWCDs have overcome this barrier and none have 
imposed production quotas); Corwin Johnson, Texas Groundwater UlW: A Survey and Some 
Proposals, 22 NAT. REsoURCES J. 1017, 1020 (1982) ("The Edwards Underground Water District 
... is broadly authorized to conserve, protect and increase the recharge of and prevent the 
waste and pollution of the underground water but regulatory powers needed to implement 
those goals have not been conferred upon it. ... The main function of this district appears to 
be data collection and dissemination."); Corwin Johnson, The Continuing Voids In Texas 
Groundwater UlW: Are Concepts And Terminology To Blame?, 17 ST. MARy'S 1.J. 1281, 1282 (1985) 
("The legislature has passed the buck to local communities and the response has been slow 
and uneven."); Norris, supra note 49, at 501 ("The Texas legislature purports to distribute 
considerable power and authority to local groundwater conservation districts; however, 
several factors combine to limit their effectiveness."); Lana Shannon Shadwick, Comment, 
Obsolescence, Environmental Endangerment and Possible Federal Intervention Compel Reformation 
of Texas Groundwater UlW, 32 S. TEX. 1. REV. 641, 677 (1991) ( "In sum, funding and 
management of UWCD's illustrates how greed may manifest itself through the vehicle of local 
politics.... Admittedly, UWCDs truly epitomize the state's desire to defer regulation to local 
areas, but the result is perhaps not what the legislature intended."). 
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disseminate and plan but they are limited in their ability to disturb the 
capture rule. The Edwards Underground Water Conservation District is a 
case in point. It was created in 1959 in response to drought and the 
growing water demands in San Antonio with a general mandate to study 
ways to conserve, protect and increase the discharge of the underground 
water in the aquifer.54 The District was never given the power to limit 
pumping and although it had the paper responsibility for drought 
management planning and could declare the presence of a drought, it was 
without authority to manage and control water use during a drought. 
Originally the District included five of the six counties in the 
aquifer recharge zone but in 1987, Medina and Uvalde counties withdrew 
from the District to create their own groundwater districts. Thus, the 
jurisdiction, political clout and cooperative planning ability were further 
diluted by the flight of these two counties. 
After having been weakened by the flight of Medina and Uvalde 
counties, and considering its limited enforcement responsibilities, the Texas 
legislature put the organization to death when it established the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority.55 
3. The Edwards Aquifer Authority: A Planning and Regulatory Giant 
In response to prompting from Judge Bunton, and to prevent 
federal regulation of groundwater pumping, the Texas Legislature 
established the Edwards Aquifer Authority (Authority).56 The Legislature 
created a planning and regulatory institution with sweeping powers to 
manage, conserve and protect the aquifer. As might be expected, the Act 
is a carefully crafted political compromise incorporating urban, rural, 
industrial, environmental and recreational interests,57 but in many ways it 
is tilted to favor rural and agricultural interests.58 As originally structured 
citizen representation on the Board underrepresented some groups and ran 
54. See R.S. ch. 99, 1959 Tex. Gen. Laws 173. 
55. S.B. 1477, codified as Act of June 11, 1993, R.S. ch 626,1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, § 
1.41 (effectively abolishing the EUWD by transferring its assets to the Authority). 
56. [d. 
57. See Aquifer Dust-Up: How Cities, Fanns and Critters Coexist is Our Fight Too, HOUSIUN 
POST, Feb. 7, 1993, at C2; David McLemore, Endangered Aquifer, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 
26,1994, at A41. 
58. See S.B. 1477, supra note 55, § 1.29(e) agricultural users fees cannot exceed twenty 
percent of municipal and industrial fees; § 1.31(b) (the Authority must maintain all 
agricultural water meters at no cost to the farmer); §1.26(2), (4) (irrigators and industrial users 
must be treated equally in the critical management plan). 
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afoul of the Voting Rights Act,59 a problem the Texas legislature was forced 
to correct in 1995.60 
But the legal challenges did not stop there. Soon after its passage, 
a consortium of rural interests challenged the constitutionality of the Act, 
alleging, inter alia, that the Act deprived landowners of a vested property 
right.61 The Texas Supreme Court finally upheld the Act's constitutionality 
in June 1996. 
Highlights of the Act include: 
(1) Users may not withdraw water from the aquifer 
without a permit.62 
(2) However, users whose wells are for domestic or 
livestock purposes and withdraw less than 25,000 gallons a 
day do not need a permit.63 
(3) A "Pinocchio provision" requires pre-existing 
users to apply for permits based on their claimed historical 
water usage during the period from June, 1972 to May, 
1993.64 
(4) Preference is granted to pre-existing users over 
65new users.
(5) Pre-existing irrigators are guaranteed two acre­
feet yearly for the maximum number of acres irrigated 
during the 1972-1993 time period, however, new irrigators do 
not have this guarantee.66 
(6) Marketing water is allowed provided the transfers 
take place within the geo-political confines of the Edwards 
Aquifer region.67 Irrigators may only market (lease) up to 50 
percent of their water, while other permit holders are 
allowed to market their entire right.68 
59. See State of Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 20 (1994). The Voting Rights Act is 
codified as amended at 42 U.s.c. § 1973c (1994) (enumerating requirement that any voting 
qualification, prerequisite, standard or procedure must not abridge voting rights on basis of 
race or color). 
60. Act of May 29,1995, RS. ch. 261, 1995 TEX. SESS. LAW SERVo 2505 (West 1995). 
61. Barshop V. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618 
(Tex. 1996). 
62. See S.B. 1477 supra note 55, at § 1.15. 
63. Id. at §§ 1.16, 1.33. 
64. Id. at § 1.16. 
65. Id. at § 1.16. 
66. ld. at §1.16(e). 
67. Id. at § 1.34. 
68. Id. 
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(7) The Authority may engage in water marketing 
either as a transaction facilitator or to retire water from69use.
(8) The Authority must develop a comprehensive 
water plan for the region that includes conservation, future 
supply development and demand management.70 In 
conjunction with this effort, individual permit holders may 
be required to submit conservation and reuse plans.71 
(9) In additional to the comprehensive plan, the 
Authority must develop and implement a critical 
management plan to deal with drought. The plan must 
designate discretionary and non-discretionary water uses 
and could require reductions in both types of uses. 
Municipal, domestic and livestock uses have the highest 
priority followed by industrial, crop irrigation, landscape 
irrigation and recreation uses.72 
(to) Driving this planning effort is a limitation on the 
amount of water that can be withdrawn from the aquifer. 
Aquifer withdrawals are limited to 450,000 acre-feet annually 
(400,000 by 2008); withdrawal amounts for all users m'i( be 
reduced in order to meet the total aquifer target limits. 
(11) The Authority must ensure that by December 31, 
2012, the continuous minimum springflows of Comal and 
San Marcos Springs are maintained to protect those 
endangered and threatened species to the extent required by 
federallaw.74 
(12) In addition to the water quantity provisions the 
Authority is charged with preventing waste or pollution to 
the aquifer. The pollution prevention jurisdiction extends to 
a five-mile buffer zone outside the Edwards Aquifer. 
Pollution regulations must be uniform throughout the 
counties within the Authority.75 
(13) Smaller scale underground water districts may 
co-exist within the boundaries of the Authority so long as 
their powers, duties and regulations are not inconsistent with 
those of the Authority.76 
69. Id. at § 1.22. 
70. Id. at § 1.25. 
71. Id. at § 1.23. 
72. Id. at § 1.26. 
73. Id. at § 1.14(b), (c) 
74. Id. at § 1.14. 
75. Id. at § 1.08. 
76. Id. at §§ 1.42, 1.43. 
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Although the Authority has significant regulatory powers, it 
cannot impose taxes and must rely on user pumping fees77 and legislative 
appropriations to operate?B This may prove to be its "Achilles heel," a 
defect perhaps intended by the Legislature to frustrate the Authority's 
ultimate purpose. 
By late 1996, the Authority began the process of detennining the 
amount of water to be authorized under individual pumping pennits. This 
process will carry over for a number of years. During the winter and early 
spring of 1997, the Authority experimented with a water transfer program 
by brokering the purchase of dry year options from irrigators in Medina 
and Uvalde counties.79 
An increasing water demand resulting from population growth 
and a limited Aquifer supply are the twin forces driving the reallocation 
imperative. This paper suggests that this reallocation can be accomplished 
by voluntarily transferring water between competing users based on a 
water-marketing paradigm. The remainder of the paper describes a general 
framework for marketing along with the results of a willingness to market 
survey of water pumpers conducted in 1995. Since the Authority was not 
operating at that time, we theorized that this survey would help gauge the 
potential for water transfers and marketing. 
III. A MARKET FRAMEWORK FOR REALLOCATING EDWARDS
 
AQUIFER WATER
 
Conflict is inherent in the management, allocation and protection 
of water and other shared natural resources. When shared resources are 
abundant, their allocation is generally free from economic, political, legal, 
institutional and geographical tensions. Conflict arises over competition for 
scarce resources, or when parties involved in decision making disagree 
about actions that have the potential to have negative impacts on 
77. The Edwards Aquifer Authority operates on a user pays principle. The Act creating 
the Authority gives it the power to levy fees to defray its operational cost. See Act of June 11, 
1993, R.S. ch 626,1993 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2350, § 1.29. In 1997, its inaugural year for full scale 
operation, the Authority set pumping fees at $11 per acre-foot for municipal and industrial 
users and $2 per acre-foot for agricultural users. See Carmina Danini & Jerry Needham, 
Edwards Panel Oks New Fees for Agricultural Water Pumpers, SAN ANToNIO ExpRESS-NEWS, June 
11,1997, at lA. 
78. [d. The 1996-97 operating budget for the Authority totaled $ 5.2 million. Of this total, 
pumping fees paid by users provided about $2.3 million. 
79. See discussion infra part IV, C. 
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environmental or human health.so In the Edwards Aquifer region conflicts 
arise from (1) concerns over the preservation of irrigated agriculture and 
the economic and social consequences in these farming areas with few 
profitable alternatives; (2) increasing municipal water demands in the San 
Antonio Metropolitan area; (3) the need for water to support the military 
bases in San Antonio; (4) protection of environmental amenities and 
recreational activities dependent on springflows; and (5) the 
interdependency between surface and groundwater flows. The status quo 
cannot continue. A certain, consistent and predictable supply of water is 
not available to meet all of these needs, and a mechanism is needed to 
allocate water fairly and efficiently. Water markets can, in part, provide 
that mechanism. 
A. Benefits of Water Markets 
Negotiated water transfers can play an important economic, 
political and social role in reallocating scarce water to meet changing 
demands. Water marketing is an alternative to a forced reallocation of 
water and has the potential to (1) provide water to growing cities;81 (2) 
manage drought;82 (3) provide water for environmental and recreational 
80. Examples include: disputes over prohibiting certain uses of national parks and 
forests, fish and game hunting regulations and harvest limits, and reallocation of water from 
agriculture to municipal uses. More recently, the 1996 Texas drought highlighted the conflicts 
arising from water scarcity and illustrated the importance of resolving, in an efficient and 
equitable manner, disputes over allocation of a critical natural resource. 
81. Most of the water marketing literature describes agricultural-ta-urban water transfers 
as a means to provide water to growing cities. See, e.g., MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, 
OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM ORREVOLlITION FOR WESTERN WATER (1990); NAT'L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16 
(1993); RICHARD W . WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHlS AND 
THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1989); Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, Moving 
Agricultural Water to Cities: the Search for Smarter Approaches, HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J. 
ENVTL L. & POL'y, Fall 1994, at 27. 
Texas' population is projected to double in the next 50 years, resulting in an increase 
in municipal water use and a decline in agricultural water use. Some of this new water for 
urban needs will come from agricultural-to-urban transfers. See TEXAS WATER Dev. BD., 
WATER FOR TEXAS, TODAY & TOMORROW 3-3 (Tex. Water Dev. Bd. 1990). 
82. The California Drought Water Bank demonstrated that water marketing can meet 
urban water needs during drought conditions. The Bank was organized very quickly and 
provided over 820,000 acre-feet of water in 1991. The $125 acre-foot purchase price for water 
was adequate to attract enough sellers and the sales price of $175 acre-foot was attractive to 
a number of purchasers. The Bank spent some $100 million on puimases in 1991 and received 
$68 million in revenues from purchasers (the difference being accounted for by the unsold 
water held in storage in the State Water Project). 
A number of studies and reports have chronicled the development and operation of 
the California Drought Water Bank. See, e. g., CAUF. DEP'T OF WATER Resources, 1991 
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needs;83 (4) promote efficient water use;84 (5) encourage conservation;85 (6) 
DROUGHT WATER Bank (Calif. Dep't of Water Resources 1992); DAVID L. MITcHELL, WATER 
MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA:- REsoLVING THIRD-PARTY IMPACf ISSUES (Bay Area Economic 
Forum, 1993); Richard E. Howitt et aI., A RiITROSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA'S 1991 EMERGENCY 
DROUGHT WATER BANI< (Calif. Dep't of Water Resources 1992); RiCHARD W. WAHL, WATER 
MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: PAST EXPERIENCE, FunJRE PROSPECTS (REAsoN FOUND., POL'y 
STUDY No. 162, 1993); SHARING SCARcm: GAINERS AND La;ERS IN WATER MAR1<ETING (Harold 
Carter et aI., eds. 1994). 
83. A new demand for water is for instream flows that provide for non-eonsumptive 
environmental, recreational and tourism uses. Recreation and tourism drive this demand, 
which have become major industries in many western states, rivaling or surpassing 
agriculture in gross state revenues. In recent years, organizations have acquired water rights 
to protect instream flows for recreational uses. See Paul R. Williams & Stephen J. McHugh, 
Water Marketing and Instream Flows: The Next Step in Protecting California Instream Values, 9 
STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 132, 166-67 (1990). 
Apart from the substantial economic values associated with recreational use of water 
there is a growing public recognition and demand for maintenance of environmental integrity 
that comes from leaving a certain amount of water in place. Changing water use from 
consumptive off-stream uses to maintaining a certain instream and estuary freshwater inflow 
has become a major priority. See NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 81. 
A more pragmatic approach to providing water for environmental and recreational 
values is to authorize agencies to appropriate water for these purposes through the use of 
water transfers. Water in the California Drought Water Bank was purchased by the state 
Department of Fish and Game and used to protect environmental values and fisheries during 
the 1992 drought year. More than 24,000 acre-feet of water, or 15 percent of the allocation 
from the bank, was used to protect environmental and recreational values. See RONALD 
KAIsER, LEGAL AND INsrnunONAL BARRIERS TO WATER MARKETING IN TEXAS 46 (Tex. Water 
Resources Inst., Technical Report No. 1671994). 
84. From a purely economic perspective, water transfers make good sense. The notion 
of valuing water based on its highest and best economic use is captured in the National Water 
Commission discussion on the value of water: 
The comparison of water values in alternative uses will become increasingly 
important in the years ahead as growing demands compete for limited natural 
supplies and values in use increase. The opportunities for net gains by better 
allocations will be much greater. Not only will efficiency in the design offacilities 
be important, but also efficiency in allocation of water itself Economic values 
provide the best general indication of the basic worth of water if appropriate 
attention is given to protection ofenvironmental values. 
NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FunJRE 47 (U.S. Water Resources 
Council 1973) (emphasis added). The Commission basically adopted a market-based 
paradigm by equating highest use for water with the economists' "efficient allocation" model. 
85. Three common models can be found in water conservation strategies: (1) prescriptive 
requirements compelling water rights holders to adopt new technology or follow best 
management practices, (2) government subsidies to water users enabling them to purchase 
new equipment, and (3) market based sales of conserved water. See A. Dan Tarlock, The 
Changing Meaning of Water Conservation in the West, 66 NEB. L. REv. 145 (1987). 
An incentive-based approach would grant water rights holders permission to sell 
trade or market that water saved through conservation practices. California and Oregon allo\\ 
for conserved water to be sold. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1010, 101l(b), 1012 (West Cum 
Supp.); OR. REv. STAT. § 537.455 (West 1988 & 1996 Supp.). 
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provide an alternative to new reservoir construction;86 and (7) promote 
political and social harmony.87 These benefits are apropos to the Edwards 
Aquifer region and can encourage the marketing of water rights. They 
become especially important in developing water marketing as part of the 
demand management program required of the Authority. 
B. Water Market Requirements 
Water markets differ from other natural resource commodity 
markets for a variety of reasons, including the long tradition of subsidized 
water, the concentration of large amounts of public water held by private 
entities, the equally long tradition that water must support a wide variety 
of collective public values and the distribution impacts on parties who are 
not part of the decision process.88 Thus, unregulated markets do not exist 
for water transfers,89 as transfers are directed and controlled by state 
86. The traditional state response to an increasing water demand and a limited supply 
was to augment the supply through construction of additional reservoirs. Throughout the 
western states proposals to augment supply face stringent fiscal and political constraints. 
Better management is imperative to accommodate increasing demands for consumptive and 
non-eonsumptive uses. Transfers of water from low value agricultural uses to higher valued 
municipal uses are becoming the norm rather than the exception. With varying degrees of 
enthusiasm, water suppliers, consumers, brokers, legislators and increasingly influential 
segments of the environmental community have accepted the premise that water marketing 
should be a major component of future western water law policy. See NAT'L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 81, at 2. 
The state of Texas recognized the potential of water marketing-the transfer of water 
rights from existing uses to new uses at market value-by making this reallocation 
mechanism a significant part of state water policy. The 1990 Texas Water Plan suggests that 
future municipal water demand can be met by reallocating existing water supplies with 
minimal need for new reservoir development. See TExAs WATER DEY. Bo., WATER FOR TEXAS: 
TOOAY & TOMORROW 4-1 (1990). 
87. See Ronald Kaiser, Texas Water Marlceting in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and 
Legal Analysis, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181, 183-96 (1996). 
88. Third party impacts of water transfers are an important consideration in western 
water reallocation. To date most of the literature has focused on identifying the array of 
parties and types of impacts from water transfers. The most complete discussion of third party 
impacts can be found in NATL RESEARCH COUNOL, supra note 81 at, 3s-69 (1992); See also 
Kenneth R Weber, Effects ofwater transfers on rural areas: a response to Shupe, Weatherford, and 
Checchio, 30 NAT. RESoURCES J. 13 (1990); Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water 
Rights Allocation and Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 
(1987); Susan Nunn & Helen Ingram, Information, the Decision Forum and Third Party Effects in 
Water Transfers, 24 WATER RES. RESEARCH 473 (1988). 
89. In theory this type of market would not be regulated or controlled by laws or 
institutions except to protect the unfettered freedom of the market. The perfect market 
describes an economists' theoretical framework. It is not the economic reality of western water 
practices. See NATL RESEARCH COUNOL, supra note 81, at 3; BoNNIE SALlBA & DAVID B. BUSH, 
WATER MARKETs IN THEORY AND PRAcnCE: MARKET TRANSFERS, WATER VALUES ANO PuBLIC 
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regulatory agencies.90 In reality, water transfers more often resemble 
diplomatic negotiations than simple commodity transactions. 
Water markets develop when a combination of economic, legal, 
institutional and technical factors converge so that buyers can obtain a 
more certain, consistent and predictable water supply relative to other 
options and sellers realize greater net benefits by transferring the water 
than by keeping it in an existing use.91 The classic economic rationale of 
gains from trade motivates most water transfers, however, legal, in 
stitutional and technical barriers can vitiate transfers. 
The success of water marketing in the Edwards Aquifer region will 
be determined by: (1) the increasing demand for water driven by 
population growth and environmental needs;92 (2) the limited availability 
POLICY (Studies in Water Pol'y and Management No. 12, Charles Howe ed., 1987); Victor 
Brajer et aI., The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water Markets as They Affect Water Scarcity and 
Sovereignty Interests in the West, 29 NAT. REsoURCES J. 489, 495-506 (1989). 
90. In Texas all transfers of surface water rights require the approval of the Texas Natural 
Resource Conservation Commission. See TExAs WATER CODE ANN. § 11.122 (West Supp. 1998); 
30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 295.71 (West 1995). 
91. For a bibliography on water marketing see Ronald Kaiser & Michael McFarland, A 
Bibliographic Pathfinder on Water Marketing, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 4 (1997). For other articles 
discussing the economic, legal, technical and institutional conditions necessary for water 
markets see, for example, Terry L. Anderson, The Market Alternative for Hawaiian Water, 25 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 893 (1985); Victor Brajer et aI., supra note 86; H. Stuart Burness & James 
Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers and Economic Efficiency: The Colorado River, 23 J. LAW & 
ECON. 111 (1980); Arthur Chan, To Market or Not to Market: Allocation of Interstate Waters, 29 
NAT. REsoURCES J. 529 (1989); Ronald G. Cummings & Vahram Nercissiantz, The Use of Water 
Pricing as a Means for Enhancing Water Use Efficiency in Irrigation: Case Studies in Mexico and the 
United States, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 731 (1992); Richard L. Gardner, Institutional Impediments 
to Efficient Water Allocation, 5 POL'y STUD. REv. 353 (1985); Ronald C. Griffin & Fred O. Boadu, 
Water Marketing in Texas: Opportunities for Reform, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 265 (1992); KEITH 
HIGGINS & JACK BARNETT, WATER RiGHTS AND THEIR TRANSFER IN THE WESTERN UNITED 
STATES (1984); Charles Howe et aI., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential for 
Water Markets, 22 WATER RES. RESEARCH 439 (1986); Ronald Johnson, The Definition ofa Surface 
Water Right and Transferability, 24 J.L. & ECON. 273 (1981); Ronald Kaiser, Texas Water 
Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal Analysis, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181, 
(1996); Bonnie Saliba, Do Water Markets Work? Market Transfers and TradeOffs in the 
Southwestern States, 23 WATER RES. RESEARCH 1113 (1987); RODNEY T. SMITH, TRADING WATER: 
AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATER MARKETING (1988). 
92. Texas' population has doubled in the past 35 years from 9.5 million in 1960 to 19 
million today. The State Water Plan predicts that Texas' population will double again in the 
next 50 years, increasing to over 36 million residents by the year 2050. See TEXAS WATER 
DEVELOPMENT BoARD, WATER FOR TEXAS-TODAY AND TOMORROW 3-4 (1990). 
In the Edwards Aquifer region water is used primarily for irrigation, industrial uses 
and municipal uses. Pumping has increased dramatically in all three sectors. Nearly all the 
irrigation uses takes place in Medina and Uvalde counties. Since 1966, irrigation use in these 
two counties has increased from an estimated 43,0000 acre-feet/yr to an estimated 160,0000 
acre-feet in 199O-a 400 percent increase. Municipal pumping has increased with the growth 
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of alternative supplies;93 (3) undervalued water uses;94 (4) a critical mass of 
buyers and sellers;95 (5) available water information;96 (6) reasonable 
of the regions' population and economy. In the same 1966-1991 time period, all municipal and 
industrial use increased from 164,0000 acre feet/yr to 308,000 acre-feet!yr -a 180 percent 
increase. San Antonio's water use has increased from 90,000 acre-feet!yr in 1966 to 158,000 
acre-feet!y in 1991-a 60 percent increase. It is estimated that total municipal water demand 
will roughly double by 2040 from 285,000 acre-feet!yr in 1990 to 566,000 acre-feet in 2040. See 
SAWS, supra note 18. 
93. Historically, water has been obtained through: (1) appropriating surface water rights 
in the basin to which no previous claim has been made; (2) constructing surface water 
development projects to capture, store, and transport water for areas in the basin where local 
supplies are perceived as inadequate; (3) interbasin transfer of water; and (4) pumping 
groundwater. The economic and political difficulty encountered in seeking to justify large­
scale surface water development projects makes the future of this option very dim. In Texas, 
complete appropriation of some surface water and mining of groundwater supplies is a 
problem. According to data from the Texas Natural Resource Conserva~on Commission there 
is limited or no water available for new appropriation in the Colorado River Basin; (the 
Guadalupe River Basin upstream of Canyon and Coleto Creek Reservoirs; the San Antonio 
River Basin upstream from Lakes Medina and Applewhite; the Nueces River Basin upstream 
of the Zavala/Dimrnit counties water. Thus, little, if no, surface water is available in the San 
Antonio river basin for appropriation. As a result, San Antonio must seek to acquire water 
through interbasin transfers, reuse of treated effluent, or purchase of water rights in the 
Edwards Aquifer. See TExAs NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION COMM'N, A REGULATORY 
GUIDANCE DocuMENT FOR ApPLICATIONS TO DNERT, STORE OR USE STATE WATER 19 (March 
28,1994). 
94. The reallocation of water through a market system is driven by the prospect of 
economic gains from transferring water to a location, season or purpose of use in which it 
generates higher net benefits than under the existing use pattern. In other words, if it's 
cheaper to obtain water by pumping groundwater or by building a new reservoir than it is 
to buy water from another user, then purchases will be forsaken for pumping or dam 
building. In spite of claims of water's enormous economic importance, water actually exhibits 
a relatively low marginal value. The estimated direct marginal value productivity of irrigation 
water falls in the range of $25-$75 per acre-foot. See Robert Young, Why Are there So Few 
Transactions Among Water Users? 68 AM. J. AGRlc. ECON. 1143, 1144 (1986). 
95. For a market to function efficiently, no one buyer or seller, or group of buyers or 
sellers should have the power to fix the price of water. Monopolistic practices result when one 
buyer or one seller can control the market. In economic terms, a "critical mass" is not 
numerically defined but simply means that no one party acting alone can affect the price of 
water. Applying this concept to water transfers would mean that more than one city 
(purchaser) and more than one supplier (farmer, rancher or water district) should be involved 
in the market process. See Brajer et aI., supra note 89. 
96. An important predicate to successful transfer program is the availability of market 
information. Data on prices, potential sellers and buyers, delivery conditions and other 
market transactions must be available to the parties in order to have an efficient market. 
Buyers and sellers must have easy and inexpensive access to this type of information for a 
market to work successfully. See Kaiser, supra note 87, at 209-11; 1 LAWRENCE MACDONNELL, 
THE WATER TRANSFER PROCFSS AS A MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER 
DEMANDS (USGS Grant Rep. No. 14-08-Q01-G1538, 1990); Victor Brajer et aI., supra note 89. 
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transaction costs,97 (7) defined and enforceable rights to water;98 (8) minimal 
transfer restrictions, (9) public interest reviews;99 (10) a conveyance 
system;lOO and (11) institutional promotion.1Ol (See Figure 2). Most of these 
97. Water transfers can be greatly influenced by transaction cost. In economic terms, 
transaction costs are the aggregate costs incurred as part of the transfer process that can be 
apportioned to buyers, sellers, state or local agencies and institutions, and third parties. They 
are the costs associated with making the market system work. Transaction costs are incurred 
in searching for trading partners, in application and brokerage fees, in public hearing and 
agency reviews, in legal and technical help, in identifying the legal and physical characteris­
tics of water rights (priority date, point of diversion, consumptive use and other permit condi­
tions), in arranging price, financing and other transfer terms, in satisfying conditions imposed 
by state laws, in internalizing externalities imposed on third parties, and in treating, trans­
porting and storage costs. See generally, NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 81, at 43; 
MACDONNELL, supra note 96, at 43-45; BoNNIE COLBY ET AL., WATER TRANSFER AND TRANS­
ACTION COSTS: CASE STIJDIES IN COLORADO, NEW MEXICO, UTAH AND NEVADA 54 (Dept. of 
Agric. Econ., Univ. of Ariz., July 1989). 
98. Economists argue that defined and enforceable property rights in water are a critical 
factor in facilitating market-based transfers. A property rights system that embodies water 
ownership, exclusivity, transferability and enforceability can produce an efficient allocation 
of water. See generally SMrrn, supra note 91; HIGGINS & BARNETT, supra note 91; SAUBA & BUSH, 
supra note 89; TOM TiEl'ENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL REsoURCE ECONOMICS ch. 3 
(3d ed., 1992). 
99. Except for Colorado and Oklahoma, all of the western states require "public interest" 
reviews for surface water transfers. These statutes vary considerably in outlining the criteria 
for public interest review and in granting regulatory agencies the discretion in defining the 
term. Some statutes simply require a public interest review without defining what is meant 
by the term. New Mexico, South Dakota, Nevada, and Texas allow a regulatory agency to 
reject a transfer application where the transfer is detrimental to the public interest, not in the 
public interest, threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest, or is detrimental to the 
public welfare. For a discussion of public interest reviews see generally Consuelo Bokurn, 
Implementing the Public Welfare Requirement in New Mexico's Water Code, 36 NAT. REsoURCES 
J. 441 (1997); Kaiser, supra note 87, at 219-22; NATLRESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 81, at 255; 
Douglas Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation and Transfer in the West: Recogni­
tion of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 (1987). 
100. A means of efficiently and effectively moving water from the seller to the new 
purchaser must exist. This conveyance is not a problem for surface water transfers if the 
purchaser is downstream from the seller. The seller merely uses the natural conduit (the river) 
to convey water. The importance of a conveyance system to an effective water market is 
illustrated by the states of California and Colorado. Both have elaborate systems for moving 
water from the source of supply to the user. California moves water from the northern to the 
southern portion of the state-a distance of more than 500 miles. Similarly, Colorado has 
developed a system for moving water across the continental divide to serve the growing 
population centers on the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains. For a description of the 
California conveyance system see JOSEPH SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER REsoURCES 
679 (2d ed. 1991). 
101. Water institutions typically are structured to plan, develop, manage and regulate 
water resources. Institutions that have planning and regulatory functions can playa signifi­
cant role in promoting and facilitating water transfers. Planning processes that encourage 
transfers as a means of reallocating scarce water resources represent a positive form of state 
water policy. For a generally overview of institutional promotion of marketing see Barton 
Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL L. REV. 671, 707-23 
(1993). 
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criteria are theoretically present in the Edwards Aquifer region and the 
potential for marketing does exist. Some uncertainty is present regarding 
a critical mass of buyers and sellers, information on water availability and 
pricing, transfer restrictions and a conveyance system for the water. This 
article attempts to answer some of these questions. 
IV. WILLINGNESS TO MARKET 
Since there is no evidence that groundwater rights were transferred 
in the Edwards region before the passage of the Edwards Aquifer Act, this 
study sought to determine if a potential exists for water markets based on 
a "willingness to transfer profile" of groundwater pumpers. The rationale 
is that in the absence of a market, a willingness to transfer is the best 
evidence to suggest the potential for markets. 
A. Data Collection 
Data for this study is taken from telephone interviews with 105 
groundwater pumpers who individually extract more than 18 million 
gallons of water per year from the Edwards Aquifer.102 Due to pending 
litigation by some Medina and Uvalde county irrigators, all attempts to 
obtain a list of irrigators in these counties were denied. Efforts to obtain a 
list under state and federal Freedom of Information Acts were not 
successful. For this reason, the scope of the study was limited to Bexar, 
Comal, & Hays counties. However, the experimental 1997 Irrigation 
Suspension Plan of the Edwards Aquifer Authority in Medina and Uvalde 
counties tends to corroborate the findings of this study. We believe that 
these large pumpers are more likely than smaller operators to be in a 
position to participate in water marketing ventures. 
Because this group is not large, we surveyed the entire population. 
Twenty-eight irrigators, and representatives of 38 municipalities and 39 
industries (n=lOS) completed the interviews. The value of this study is that 
it provides important information regarding major pumpers in the area 
who would likely be involved in any water marketing.103 
102. The list of individuals, companies, and agencies pumping water from the Edwards 
Aquifer were obtained from the Edwards Underground Water District (EUWD) and the Texas 
Water Development Board (TWDB). EUWD's lists included irrigators, municipalities, and 
industrial water users in Bexar, Comal, and Hays counties that pump 18 million gallons per 
year or more. 
103. Descriptive statistics and non-parametric analysis of variance were the analytical 
tools used in this study. Initial testing showed that the data did not pass the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance required in analysis of variance testing. Therefore, a non-parametric, 
one-way analysis of variance test (the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test) was 
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B. The Transfer Landscape 
There is a strong desire on the part of many irrigators and 
municipalities for water transfers, and we believe that conditions exist for 
the development of water markets in the Edwards Aquifer. Experiences 
from other regions of Texas and from other western states suggest that 
organized markets in the Edwards Aquifer region will develop in response 
to scarcity.lOol A willingness to market does not always equate to an actual 
market practice. 
Pumpers in the Edwards Aquifer region indicated that in varying 
degrees they would pursue water transfers (see Table 1). Irrigators and 
municipalities exhibited the greatest willingness to engage in transfers. 
Nearly 60 percent of the irrigators and 55 percent of the municipalities 
indicated some degree of likelihood that they would pursue marketing in 
the near future. 
All groups thought that some barriers to marketing existed but that 
over time these barriers would fall. Uncertainties over legal rights to 
groundwater and over how to structure transfer agreements were the 
major barriers to willingness to engage in transfers, but these were not 
insunnountable hurdles preventing water transfers. 
employed in the analysis. This test is less stringent when assumptions of normality and equal 
variance are violated. The null hypothesis for the Kruskal-Wallis test postulates that there are 
no differences between the groups; the alternate hypothesis is that at least one group differs 
from the others. 
Analysis of variance usually employs a multiple comparison test, such as Scheffe, 
Duncan or Tukey. These tests were not applicable here. Instead, the Wilcoxon rank sum test, 
which is similar to a t-test but has less stringent assumptions regarding normality and equal 
variance, was employed to identify group differences. The null-hypothesis of the Wilcoxon 
test is that the populations are identical; the alternate hypothesis is that one of the groups is 
different. For a discussion of this statistical procedure see DENNIS E. HINKLE IT AL., ApPLIED 
STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 18, 102-24 (1994). 
104. See infra notes 127-28. 
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Table 1. Likelihood That Respondents Will Pursue Water Marketing In The 
Near Future. 
LIKELIHOOD Irrigators Municipalities Industries 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Not at all likely 6 21 14 38 20 56 
Not very likely a a 2 5 1 3 
Somewhat likely 5 18 3 8 4 11 
Not very likely 5 18 3 8 5 14 
Extremely likely 6 21 14 38 5 14 
Don't Know 6 21 1 3 1 3 
1. Agriculture to Urban Transfers 
Edwards Aquifer transfers will most likely move water from lower 
valued agricultural uses to higher valued urban and industrial uses. This 
is consistent with the dominant trend in western water transactions where 
water has moved from irrigation to urban uses. lOS An analysis of responses 
to a number of questions on transfers indicated that there are statistically 
significant differences between irrigators, cities or industries in their 
willingness to sell water. When asked about selling water for 
compensation, 50 percent of irrigators indicated that they would be willing 
to sell or lease water if approached by a willing buyer whereas only 22 
percent of municipalities and 31 percent of industries were willing to sellYl6 
There exists a potential to move a large volume of water through 
transfers, which could provide a major source of water for cities during 
times of drought. For example, irrigators who are willing to transfer water 
for compensation demonstrated a willingness to transfer relatively large 
amounts of water (Table 2). Forty-two percent of these irrigators indicated 
that they would sell or lease more than 75 percent of their entitlement.107 
Municipalities and industries who indicated a willingness to sell or lease 
105. See supra note 81. 
106. There were statistically significant differences between groups' responses to this 
question (alpha = .05, critical value (df, 2) = 5.99, chi-square = 10.65, P = .01). Further pairwise 
testing showed that irrigators' responses were significantly different than municipalities' (p 
=.002) and industries' (p =.017) at the .05IeveI. 
107. This raises interesting questions over the amount of water than can be transferred 
since irrigators are restricted from leasing more than 50 percent of the irrigation rights initially 
pennitted. See S.B. 1477, supra note 55, at § l.34(c). Perhaps the legislature was concerned over 
a large-scale transfer of agricultural water to cities and sought to protect agricultural users 
from themselves and the foibles of the marketplace. 
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water were more conservative; 33 percent of municipalities and forty-six 
percent of industries would sell 30 percent or less. More than one-quarter 
of irrigators and municipalities responded that they "didn't know," which 
indicates that these individuals either have not yet given the issue serious 
consideration or that they prefer to keep this information confidential. 
Table 2. How much of your water right would you be willing to sell or 
lease? 
SALE	 Irrigators Municipalities Industries 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
0>30 0 0 3 33 5 46 
30> 75 4 29 2 22 3 26 
75> 100 6 42 1 11 2 18 
Don'tKnow 4 29 3 33 1 10 
2. A Dilemma for Irrigators 
We theorized that irrigators would place greater importance on 
keeping water in agricultural use than other uses. As posited in the 
literature, irrigators may have more at stake in water marketing than just 
water; agricultural lifestyle and the social, economic and political fabric of 
agricultural communities may be at risk when water is transferred to non­
agricultural uses. lOB We tested irrigators' sensitivity to this issue by asking 
108. Positive and negative impacts of water transfers are often expressed in economic, 
environmental, recreational, and sodal terms. Economic effects, measured at the firm or sector 
level, include impacts on incomes, jobs and business opportunities that can have positive and 
negative contributions on local, regional and state economies. One study found that third­
party impacts, though a valid concern and deserving of attention, were overstated in the 
public debate. In this study, the types of crops affected, the level of agricultural production 
disrupted, and the resulting employment losses were small compared to the historical 
fluctuations within agriculture. An employment loss in agriculture will be offset many times 
over by the creation of new jobs in urban areas. See, e.g., Harold Carter et aI., eds., supra note 
82. 
These effects can extend to the fiscal conditions of state and local governments. For 
example in La Paz County Arizona, the purchase of water farms (farms with appurtenant 
water rights) by one municipality removed 10 percent of the taxable land from its tax base. 
This potentially could increase county tax rates and place a heavier burden on remaining 
taxpayers. See Susan Nunn & Helen Ingram, Tnfonnation, the Decision Forum and Third-Party 
Effects in Water Transfers, 24 WATER RESOURCES RES. 473-480 (1988)]. 
Social impacts tend to be non-economic, intangible and difficult to measure. 
Intangible impacts include changes in; (1) the quality of community life, (2) political 
empowerment, (3) connectedness to the land and (4) a sense of community. Rural 
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if they would prefer to keep water in agricultural use rather than transfer 
it to urban use. Analysis of the irrigator responses indicates that they favor 
sales to other ag-users (irrigators and ranchers) more than they favor 
transfers to other groups.l09 Sixty-four percent of irrigators either favored 
or strongly favored transfers to both irrigators and ranchers. Electric power 
providers were their second most frequent choice (43 percent), followed by 
municipalities (39 percent), industries and government agencies (32 
percent). 
Since the marketing literature indicated that purely economic forces 
might drive the sale or lease of water rights, we asked respondents if they 
would be willing to sell water rights to any willing buyer if the price were 
right. Nearly half of the irrigators indicated that they would sell water to 
the highest bidder. 
Thus a number of irrigators are caught on the horns of a dilemma. 
They can personally make more money by transferring their water to cities 
and industries but in so doing they risk harming their community. This 
suggests that there may be a myth and a reality to farmer economic 
behavior when it comes to water transfers. The myth may be that farmers 
act as economic optimizers in seeking to balance individual and 
community interests benefits and costs in transfers and the reality may be 
that many act as individual economic maximizers. 
One social and economic impact study of possible agricultural to 
urban water transfers in Medina and Uvalde sought to measure this 
community impact. The study projected that business economic output in 
communities, individuals and the courts are taking stands to provide a modicum of legal 
protection for an agricultural lifestyle threatened by transfer of water rights. In a celebrated 
New Mexico case involving the sale of 75 acre-feet of agricultural water rights to a ski resort, 
local irrigators challenged the transfers claiming that it was contrary to the public welfare. 
The trial court judge overturned the state engineer's approval of the transfer, finding that 
although the proposed ski resort would bring additional jobs that over the long run, the local 
inhabitants lose management jobs to outsiders and are relegated to tourism service jobs such 
as waiter and maids. The judge's ruling held that greater economic benefits are not always 
more desirable than preservation of cultural identity. The trial judge was later reversed by the 
New Mexico court of appeals based on the fact that the specific public interest language was 
not added until after the application to transfer was filed. See In re Application of Sleeper, No. 
RA84-53(c), slip op. (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist., Apr. 16, 1985), rev'd, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. App. 1988), 
cert. quashed, 759 P.2d 200 (1988). 
109. Respondents were asked if they (1) strongly favor, (2) favor, (3) neither favor nor 
oppose, (4) oppose, or (5) strongly oppose selling or leasing water rights to certain users 
including irrigators, ranchers, municipalities, industries, hydroelectric power providers, 
environmental interests, government agencies, or other private interests. To test the 
hypothesis, we constructed an "agricultural use" scale (AGUSE). This scale was constructed 
by taking the mean responses to preferences for transfers to irrigators and ranchers. A 
reliability test (Cronbach's alpha) for this scale was .917, indicating that the scale is very 
reliable and that the items are in fact correlated. 
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the two counties might decrease by $67 million, that 900 jobs might be lost 
and population might decrease by up to 2/200 people.no A limitation of this 
analysis is that it only examined negative community impacts in Medina 
and Uvalde counties and did not examine benefits to those communities 
receiving the transferred water.1ll 
3. Transaction Assessments-The Hesitant Irrigator & the Willing City 
Irrigators may be worried about the economic, environmental and 
social consequences to their communities if they transfer water to cities, but 
they are less interested in determining and revealing these impacts than are 
cities.112 (Table 3). Cities were most convinced that specific impact 
assessments should be completed prior to transfer approval, while less 
than half of irrigators and industrial respondents held this view. 1I3 
Respondents were asked to express preferences as to who should be 
responsible for conducting and reviewing the results of impact assessment. 
Irrigators tended to favor local control whereas cities and industries 
favored state oversight, but the differences between them were small. l14 
110. BBC RESEARCH & CONSULTING, SocIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF WATER 
TRANSFERS: A CASE STUDY OF THE EDWARDS AQUIFER XIII-4 (1996). 
111. Id., at VI-2. 
112. Pairwise comparisons of responses to the questions about economic impact 
assessment showed that municipalities' responses were significantly different from irrigators' 
(p = .004) and industries' (p = .000). Regarding environmental impact assessment, 
municipalities' responses were also significantly different from irrigators (p=.037) and 
industries (p = .000). There were also statistically significant differences in responses 
regarding social impact assessment between municipalities and irrigators (p = .001). As in 
previous pairwise comparisons, these tests of significance were performed at the .05 level. 
113. There were statistically significant differences between groups' responses to this 
question (alpha = .05, critical value (df,2) = 5.99/ chi-square = 16.07, P =.000). Pairwise testing 
showed that municipalities' responses were significantly different than irrigators (p = .000) 
and industries (p =.001) at the .05 level. 
114. Twenty-three percent of irrigators, twenty-five percent of municipalities, and 
nineteen percent of industries believed that the Edwards AqUifer Authority should be the 
agency primarily responsible for economic impact assessments. Twenty-three percent of 
irrigators said that the seller should be responsible, and thirty-one percent of municipalities 
favored state government. Twenty-five percent of industries favored local government. There 
were no statistically significant differences between groups' responses to this question (alpha 
= .05, critical value (df, 2) =5.99/ chi-square = .63, P = .73). 
Environmental impact assessments showed a similar pattern. When asked exactly 
who should be responsible for the EIS, forty-six percent of irrigators indicated that the 
Edwards Aquifer Authority should be responsible, as opposed to twenty-six percent of 
municipalities and twenty-seven percent of industries. Municipal and industrial responses 
were also high in the state government category (twenty-nine and forty percent respectively). 
There were no statistically significant differences between groups/ responses to this question 
(alpha = .05, critical value (df/2) = 5.99/ chi-square = 2.02/ P =.37). 
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The reluctance of irrigators to reveal their participation in water 
transfer transactions was also present in the 1997 Irrigation Suspension 
Plan. lls Irrigators sought, without success, to have their identities and 
payment schedules protected from public disclosure by the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority.ll6 
Table 3. Types of impact assessments favored by respondents. 
ASSESSMENT Irrigators Municipalities Industries 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Economic 13 46 32 86 16 44 
Environmental 13 46 31 84 15 42 
Social 11 39 27 73 11 31 
4. Transaction Oversight and Supervision 
While the Authority has the regulatory responsibility for water 
transfer oversight,117 pumpers in the Edwards Aquifer region place varying 
levels of importance on the need for transfer oversight. Not surprisingly, 
irrigators want little or no oversight over transfers while cities and 
industries are willing to accept greater control. Only 39 percent of 
irrigators, as contrasted with 50 percent of industries and 89 percent of 
municipalities, indicated that some kind of prior approval process is in fact 
necessary. liB Correspondingly, there was no consensus between the groups 
surveyed as to who should take on the responsibility of transaction 
Respondents seemed less sure about social impact assessments than they were about 
the others, but thirty-nine percent of irrigators, seventy-three percent of municipalities and 
thirty-one percent of industries believed a social impact assessment should be completed prior 
to transfer approval). As was the case for environmental impact assessment, irrigators tended 
to favor the Edwards Aquifer Authority (thirty-six percent), whereas municipal and industrial 
respondents favored state government (twenty-six and thirty-six percent respectively). There 
were no statistically significant differences between groups' responses to this question (alpha 
= .05, critical value (df,2) = 5.99, chi-square = .04, P = .98). 
115. See infra Part IV.C, for a discussion of this program. 
116. Interview with Greg Ellis, General Manager, Edwards Aquifer Auth. in Austin, Tex. 
(Oct. 23, 1997). 
117. While the Act does not explicitly grant the Authority the power to review and 
approve pennit transfers, this power could be inferred from sections 1.08, 1.11, 1.15, 1.22, 1.34 
& 1.35 of the Act. See S.B. 1477, supra note 55. 
118. There were statistically significant differences between groups' responses to 
transaction oversight. (alpha=.05, critical value =5.99, chi square=16.07, p=.OOO). Pairwise 
testing indicated that municipal responses were significantly different than irrigators (p=.OOO) 
and industries (p=.OOl) at the .05 level. 
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oversight. However, forty-five percent of irrigators, thirty percent of 
municipalities and thirty-nine percent of industries favored the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority as the entity primarily responsible for such oversight 
(Table 4). 
Table 4. Agency most responsible for transfer approval. 
APPROVALS Irrigators Municipalities Industries 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
State 0 0 12 36 3 17 
County 2 18 1 3 3 17 
City 0 0 2 6 1 6 
Groundwater dist. 0 0 3 9 1 6 
Edwards Aq. Auth. 5 46 10 31 7 39 
Landowners 4 36 2 6 2 11 
Don'tKnow 0 0 3 9 1 6 
The willingness of some Edwards Aquifer irrigators, and 
municipalities to transfer water in the Edwards Aquifer was reinforced in 
1997 by the expression of interest in the Irrigation Suspension Plan 
instituted by the Edwards Aquifer Authority. More than 100 irrigators 
made offers to participate in the program. 
C. THE 1997 IRRIGATION SUSPENSION PLAN 
In late-1996 and early-1997, the Authority instituted a water bank, 
known as the Irrigation Suspension Plan, as a hedge against a summer 
drought. ll9 Under this voluntary program, the Authority obtained pledges 
from selected irrigators in Bexar, Medina, Uvalde, Comal and Atascosa 
counties to forgo irrigating crops during the summer of 1997. The 
Authority received offers from 117 fanners covering 25,987 acres of 
irrigated land. About 95 percent of the offers came from fanners in Bexar 
and Medina counties. The Authority used a scoring matrix that included 
119. The program used the dry year option as a management tool to reduce irrigation 
demand from the Edwards during a drought. It is a financial inducement to farmers for 
voluntary suspension of irrigation in exchange for a specified payment. An agreement would 
give a buyer the option to suspend the farmers' irrigation use for a specified drought period. 
Municipal and industrial users of Edwards water are potential purchasers of this water. See 
G. E. RarHE COMPANY, INC., A PILoT DRY YEAR OPTION PROGRAM TO REDUCE EDWARDS 
AQUIFER IRRIGATION DEMAND IN 1996, (report prepared for the Edwards Aquifer Liaison 
Committee members in Cooperation with the San Antonio Water System and the Guadalupe­
Blanco River Authority, 1996) 
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price, well location, type of irrigation equipment, types of crops grown and 
commitment to grow a dryland crop to winnow the list down to 40 
irrigators.12o Ultimately, 40 irrigators were paid an amount ranging from 
$40 to $750 an acre t9 not irrigated about 10,000 acres of land.121 This 
program resulted in a theoretical savings of 20,000 acre feet of water, about 
half of which would be used to insure minimum springflows and the other 
half to be available for pumping. 
Some 30 contributing cities, counties, water purveyors and businesses 
provided about $2.4 million in funding for the banl<.122 Calculations of the 
monetary contribution for each purchaser were generally determined based 
on their 1995 pumpage as a percentage of total pumping. l23 Some 
contributors, such as the city of Victoria and the Guadalupe-Blanco River 
Authority, do not pump from the Aquifer, but are located downstream of 
springs that emanate from the Aquifer. They made payments hoping that 
the effort would maintain springfloWS.124 In exchange for these payments, 
contributors to the bank would be allowed to pump 140 percent of their 
winter allowance rather than the 130 percent allowed under the drought 
stage. That 10 percent difference ranges from 14 million gallons per day for 
San Antonio to thousands of gallons per day for smaller cities.125 
It is difficult to assess the success of this pilot banking program, as 
fortuitous summer rains replenished the aquifer and provided much 
needed water for fanners. From an agricultural perspective, the program 
was very successful because 40 irrigators received windfall payments of 
some $ 2.3 million not to irrigate and mother nature provided moisture for 
the crops that otherwise would not have been available. 
Unknowns further complicate program assessment over aquifer 
transmission. Until the geology is better understood, it is difficult to 
detennine whether a reduction in pumping in Medina and Uvalde 
Counties actually produces a corresponding and measurable increase in 
water for pumpers in Bexar County. The Authority is attempting to gauge 
120. See Jerry Needham, 117 Farmers Interested in Water-for-Cash Swap, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS NEWS, Jan. 11,1997, at lB. 
121. Id. 
122. The Authority retained about 3 percent of the $ 2.4 million to cover administrative 
costs and the remainder was distributed to 40 farmers. See Chuck McCollough, EAA Plans to 
Purchase irrigation Rights from Farmers, SAN ANToNIO EXPRESS NEWS, Jan. 29, 1997, at 1. 
123. Id. 
124. See Jerry Needham, No-Irrigation Payments for Farmers Starts: Aquifer Pilot Program 
Covers 5 Counties, SAN ANToNIO EXPRESS NEWS, Feb. 7, 1997, at lB. 
125. See McCollough, supra note 122. 
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the transmissive nature of the Aquifer in Medina County by drilling test 
wells to monitor water flow. 126 
v. CONCLUSION 
The long political war over the management and regulation of the 
Edwards Aquifer ended in Austin with the passage of the Edwards Aquifer 
Authority Act; what remains are economic, legal and emotional skinnishes 
over the nuances of management and the distribution consequences of that 
management. The new challenge for Edwards Aquifer stakeholders and for 
the Authority will be to find common ground for developing negotiated 
solutions to reallocating water where the benefits of cooperation exceed the 
rewards of rivalry. A market system, driven by enlightened economic self­
interest and tempered by regulatory oversight to minimize externalities 
and balance equity, can provide a mechanism to help meet this challenge. 
Water markets require a nexus between legal, institutional, economic 
and conveyance factors to insure the transfer of water. While water 
scarcity, limitations on use and increasing demand drive the need for 
markets, laws and institutions shape markets and determine their ultimate 
success. As this paper suggests, these factors are coalescing in the Edwards 
Aquifer region so that water marketing paradigm could develop. That 
market will undoubtedly be driven by drought and shaped by the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority.127 The transfer rules and individual pumping permits 
that will be issued by the Edwards Aquifer Authority will in great part 
determine not only the shape of water markets but also their speed in 
developing. It is likely to take five to ten years for staff to review the more 
than 900 pending applications for withdrawals from the Aquifer. This 
suggests that, absent a drought or some other stimuli, a stable market 
transfer system for the Edwards Aquifer region may still be a few years 
away. 
Based not only on the results of this "willingness to market" study but 
also on the experiences with the 1997 Irrigation Suspension Plan, greater 
institutional promotion and education may be required to promote the 
development of water markets. While the Edwards Aquifer Authority is to 
be lauded for leading in the development of the Irrigation Suspension Plan, 
126. Interview with Greg Ellis, General Manager, Edwards Aquifer Auth. in Austin, Tex. 
(Oct. 23, 1997). 
127. Experience in the West suggests that water markets have largely been confined to 
drought water banks and intraorganization sales. Most states suffer from a dearth of transfers 
other than at the intraorganization level, or within the confines of a small geographical scale. 
See WATER MARKETING-THE NEXT GENERATION (Terry Anderson & Peter Hill eds., 1997); 
Kaiser, supra note 87; SAX ET AL., supra note 100; Barton Thompson, Institutional Perspective on 
Water Markets, 81 CAL. L. REv. 671 (1993). But if 1 MACDONNELL, supra note 96. 
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the potential for market and regulatory mischief is present when a 
regulatory agency seeks to act as a brokerage agency. One way to 
overcome this potential problem is for the State Water Bank to assume 
leadership in promoting and facilitating market transfers in the Edwards 
Aquifer region.128 Institutional intransigence and lack of funding seems to 
be the major reason that the Bank has not developed to its statutory 
potential. Leadership and legislative prompting may energize the Bank to 
take a more proactive role in the Edwards Aquifer region. 
Market transfers are not an elixir for all of the region's water problems. 
However, they provide a means to respond to changing economic, 
environmental and social water needs in a way that helps ensure that water 
is put to its highest and best use. The Edwards Aquifer Authority has a 
number of planning, regulatory and managerial tools in its statutory tool 
box that should be used in combination with market transfers to allocate 
water in the Edwards in ways that minimize economic, political and social 
instability. 
Eventually, the region may well face another Faustian choice so that 
markets alone will not resolve allocation conflicts. The time may come 
when water is so scarce and ecological demands are so great that people 
may face the divestiture of tangible lifestyles to protect intangible species. 
128. The Texas Water Dev. Bd. has been authorized to establish and administer a bank to 
facilitate the transfer of water among willing buyers and sellers. This authority extends to 
surface and groundwater as well as water saved through conservation practices. See TEXAS 
WATER CODE ANN. §§ 15.701-708 (West Supp. 1998) 
